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become less timely after implementation of
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JOHN O’HANLON∗
Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster LA1 4YX,
UK
Following the ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, accounting regulators sought to
replace the incurred-loss method of loan-loss provisioning by a more forward-looking
expected-loss method. Difﬁculties arose, including with respect to the weight that expected-
loss provisioning should place on objective evidence of loss relative to evidence of a less
speciﬁc and more judgemental nature. This paper provides evidence relevant to this issue by
examining whether loan-loss provisioning by UK banks was less timely under the stricter
evidence requirements of the IAS 39 incurred-loss regime implemented in 2005 than under
the less strict evidence requirements of the previous UK incurred-loss regime. It does so by
reference to the relationship in time between loan write-offs and loan-loss expense. The
results do not suggest that provisioning became less timely under the stricter evidence
requirements of IAS 39. There is no evidence that provisioning became less timely
immediately prior to the crisis of the late 2000s. Also, there is no evidence that general
provisioning, permitted under the pre-IAS 39 regime, enhanced the timeliness of loan-loss
provisioning. The results do not suggest that stricter requirements regarding the evidence
necessary to support recognition of loan losses have resulted in less timely loan-loss
provisioning.
Keywords: accounting; bank accounting; impairment; incurred loss; loan-loss provisioning
1. Introduction
Following the ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, concerns were raised about the
incurred-loss method of loan-loss provisioning, and in particular about the timeliness of banks’
recognition of loan-loss expense under that method.
1 Such concerns prompted the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to
aim to replace their existing incurred-loss methods of loan-loss provisioning by a more
forward-looking expected-loss method. This gave rise to a series of sets of proposals. These
included an IASB exposure draft, a FASB exposure draft, a joint IASB–FASB supplementary
document and further revised joint IASB–FASB proposals. All of these attracted signiﬁcant criti-
cism. There were several sources of difﬁculty in arriving at a generally acceptable expected-loss
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 method of loan-loss provisioning. Some issues that arose related to the weight that an expected-
loss provisioning method should place on objective evidence of loss relative to evidence of a less
speciﬁc and more judgemental nature. This paper provides evidence relevant to this issue by com-
paring loan-loss provisioning under two regimes that differed with regard to the strictness of their
requirements that recognition of loan losses should be supported by objective evidence of loss.
Speciﬁcally, it examines whether loan-loss provisioning by UK banks became less timely after
implementation in the UK in 2005 of IAS 39: Financial instruments – recognition and measure-
ment (issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 1999 and sub-
sequently amended) than it had been under the less strict evidence requirements of the
previous UK provisioning regime.
Prior to the implementation in the UK of IAS 39, loan-loss provisioning by UK banks was in
accordance with Statement of Recommended Accounting Practice: Banks (BBA and IBF 1997)
(hereinafter SORPB) and general requirements of UK GAAP with regard to provisioning. This
loan-loss-provisioning regime required that the recognition of a loan loss should be supported
by evidence that a loss had been incurred. It could therefore be described as an incurred-loss
regime. An effect of the implementation of IAS 39 in the UK was to replace the incurred-loss
regime of SORPB with an incurred-loss regime that had a stricter requirement that the recognition
of loan loss should be supported by objective evidence that loss had been incurred. A manifes-
tation of this was that IAS 39 eliminated the practice of general provisioning that had been per-
mitted under SORPB.
In order to compare the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning by UK banks under the stricter
evidence requirements of the IAS 39 incurred-loss regime and under the less strict evidence
requirements of the previous SORPB incurred-loss regime, this paper uses data for 37 UK
banks for the interval from 2001 to 2008. Of these 37 banks, 12 were bank holding companies
that had a UK stock market quotation at some time during this interval and the remaining 25
were usually much smaller banks which, in many cases, were UK subsidiaries of non-UK
banks. This paper’s evidence on differences between the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning
by UK banks under the IAS 39 regime and under the previous SORPB regime is based on exam-
ination of the relationship in time between current-year loan write-offs and current-year and pre-
vious-year loan-loss expense.
Some of the concerns about the alleged lack of timeliness of the IAS 39 incurred-loss method
arose from the perception that it had delayed the recognition of loan losses until the onset of the
ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s. Therefore, the paper also examines whether loan-
loss provisioning by UK banks was less timely immediately prior to accounting years ended in the
second half of 2008, when the effects of the ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s became
particularly severe, than it had been previously under IAS 39. One of the consequences of the
implementation of IAS 39 in the UK was the elimination of general provisioning, which had pro-
vided a means of recognising non-speciﬁc evidence about loan losses under the UK’s previous
SORPB regime. Therefore, the paper also examines whether the pre-IAS 39 general-provision
element of the loan-loss expense enhanced the timeliness of provisioning. The 12 bank
holding companies that had a UK stock market quotation may have differed from the other 25
banks in their incentives and ability to deploy relatively sophisticated provisioning methods in
response to the implementation of IAS 39 and other contemporaneous regulatory inﬂuences. Con-
sequently, the banks in the data set are partitioned by whether or not they had a UK stock market
quotation during the interval examined.
The evidence reported in this paper does not suggest that loan-loss provisioning by UK banks
was less timely under IAS 39 than under SORPB. For the subset of banks that had a stock market
quotation during the interval examined, there is evidence that loan-loss provisioning was more








































































 have to be qualiﬁed in light of the relatively small size of the data set for these banks. The evi-
dence does not indicate that loan-loss provisioning by UK banks was less timely immediately
prior to accounting years ended in the second half of 2008 than it had been previously under
IAS 39. Furthermore, there is no evidence that general provisioning permitted by SORPB
enhanced the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning. Overall, the results reported in this paper do
not suggest that stricter requirements, regarding the evidence necessary to support recognition
of loan losses, have resulted in less timely loan-loss provisioning.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the background to the
paper. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 describes the data used in the paper.
Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background
The loan-loss expense is typically a signiﬁcant item in the ﬁnancial statements of banks. The
consequent potential for loan-loss provisioning to have signiﬁcant economic effects, including
by contributing to procyclicality, has been documented in a number of studies (Kim and Kross
1998, Ahmed et al. 1999, Laeven and Majnoni 2003, Bikker and Metzemakers 2005, Bouva-
tier and Lepetit 2008, Beatty and Liao 2011). This section outlines the recent activity of
accounting regulators in the area of loan-loss provisioning, and indicates the contribution to
be made by the evidence in this paper in the context of that activity. It then outlines the
change in the UK loan-loss-provisioning regime that is the source of the evidence provided
by this paper.
In recent years, a number of different terminologies have been used to denote concepts
related to loan-loss provisioning. In light of this, I ﬁrst provide below a summary of these
terminologies.
















Allowance for impairment Allowance for loan losses (or
allowance for credit losses
on loans)
In this paper, ‘loan-loss expense’ denotes the income-statement charge in respect of impair-
ment losses on loans (credit losses), ‘loan-loss allowance’ denotes the contra-asset account and
‘loan-loss provisioning’ denotes the overall process of recognising loan-loss expense.
2.1 Loan-loss provisioning: recent regulatory activity
In the years following the onset of the ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, loan-loss
provisioning by banks attracted signiﬁcant attention. Much of this related to the incurred-loss
method of loan-loss provisioning. This is required by IAS 39, which became mandatory in the
UK from 2005. It is also required by US GAAP. See FAS 5: accounting for contingencies
(FASB 1975) and SEC staff accounting bulletin: no 102 – selected loan loss allowance method-
ology and documentation issues (SAB 102) (SEC 2001). Among other things, it was alleged that
the incurred-loss method may have delayed the accounting recognition of predictable loan losses,







































































 thereby contributing to procyclicality during the ﬁnancial and banking crisis by causing a concen-
tration of loss recognition in a recessionary period.
Concerns about the incurred-loss method were expressed by a number of persons and
bodies concerned with the regulation of banks. The US Comptroller of the Currency (Dugan
2009) said:
I think it’s high time to ask and answer some hard questions about loan loss provisioning. Does the
current interpretation and implementation of the incurred-loss model result in the adequate use of
forward-looking judgmental factors to permit appropriate early-in-the-cycle loss provisioning? Or
does the model itself, by its very nature, prevent that result by allowing loss recognition only when
a loss has somehow been ‘incurred’? If so, is it appropriate and feasible to make changes to the
basic approach to allow loss recognition at an early enough stage in the economic cycle to be
counter-cyclical? (pp. 6–7)
The Report of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group (Financial Crisis Advisory Group 2009),
which advised the IASB and the FASB on the implications of the ﬁnancial and banking crisis of
the late 2000s, referred both to the materiality of loans in banks’ balance sheets and to the belief
that the incurred-loss method of loan-loss provisioning had delayed the recognition of loan
losses:
While the crisis may have led to some understatement of the value of mark-to-market assets, it is
important to recognize that, in most countries, a majority of bank assets are still valued at historic
cost using the amortized cost basis. Those assets are not marked to market and are not adjusted for
market liquidity. By now it seems clear that the overall value of these assets has not been understated
– but overstated. The incurred loss model for loan-loss provisioning and difﬁculties in applying the
model – in particular, identifying appropriate trigger points for loss recognition – in many instances
has delayed the recognition of losses on loan portfolios. (p. 4)
A report by the Financial Stability Forum (2009) includes the following:
The FASB and IASB should reconsider the incurred loss model by analysing alternative approaches
for recognising and measuring loan losses that incorporate a broader range of available credit infor-
mation ...Standards setters should reconsider their current loan loss provisioning requirements and
related disclosures including by analysing fair value, expected loss and dynamic provisioning
approaches. (p. 4)
Also, The Future of Banking Commission (Consumers’ Association 2010), which was set up
in the wake of the ﬁnancial and banking crisis in the UK, includes the following:
Loans in the banking book are accounted for at their cost, less an allowance for credit losses. Account-
ing standards require that the allowance for credit losses can only be recognised when there is objec-
tive evidence that impairment has occurred. This has a procyclical effect which leads to banks
overstating proﬁtability in the up phase of the cycle, and understating proﬁtability in the down
phase of the cycle. (p. 72)
Note that some of those concerned with banking regulation called for consideration of econ-
omic-cycle-based provisioning, sometimes termed ‘dynamic provisioning’. This would permit
the loan-loss allowance at a balance sheet date to be determined in part by reference to the econ-
omic cycle rather than solely by reference to the impairment of loans in place at the balance sheet
date.
Furthermore, IASB proposals for a revised accounting treatment of loan losses, referred








































































 regulators, accounting regulators, professional accounting ﬁrms and bodies representing accoun-
tants and ﬁnancial analysts.
2 Often with reference to the ﬁnancial and banking crisis, commenta-
tors referred to ‘delay’ (in loss recognition), (lack of) ‘timely recognition’ (of credit losses),
(losses being recognised) ‘too late’, and (the desirability of replacing the incurred-loss method
by a method that permits) ‘earlier recognition’ (of loan losses).
In a wide-ranging Europe-wide comparison of the quality of accounting by banks before and
after mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Gebhardt and
Novotny-Farkas (2011) suggest that the IAS 39 incurred-loss method leads to delayed recognition
of loan losses. Using a measure derived from asymmetric earnings-persistence measures proposed
by Basu (1997) and Nichols et al. (2009), they report that loan-loss provisioning by European
banks became less asymmetrically timely under the IAS 39 incurred-loss method than it had
been previously.
Concerns about the incurred-loss method of loan-loss provisioning helped prompt the pub-
lication in November 2009 by the IASB of Exposure draft ED/2009/12: ﬁnancial instruments –
amortised cost and impairment (IASB 2009), which proposed replacing the incurred-loss
method by a more forward-looking expected-loss method. Although commentators mainly wel-
comed the proposal to introduce a more forward-looking loan-loss-provisioning method, sig-
niﬁcant criticism was directed at the IASB’s proposed expected-loss method. One prominent
source of comment was the exposure draft’s proposal that expected credit losses should be
reﬂected in the computation of the effective interest rates on loans at the outset and that, con-
sequently, the recognition of expected credit losses on newly originated loans should be spread
over the life of the loans. Other issues that arose related to the loan-speciﬁc or closed-portfolio-
speciﬁc level of detail at which the IASB’s proposed method would have to be applied. In May
2010, the FASB issued Proposed accounting standards update: accounting for ﬁnancial instru-
ments and revisions to the accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities (FASB
2010). The FASB’s proposals differed from the IASB’s proposals in a number of respects. An
important difference was that the FASB’s effective interest rates on loans would not reﬂect
expected credit losses, and that expected losses on newly originated loans would therefore
be recognised in the loan-loss allowance at the outset rather than being spread over the life
of the loans. Another difference was that impairment losses would reﬂect all information relat-
ing to past events and existing conditions, but not potential future events. Another difference
with respect to the IASB’s proposals was that loans would be recognised at fair value on the
balance sheet. The FASB’s proposals also attracted signiﬁcant criticism, including with
respect to the above-mentioned features.
3 From the end of the comment period for the
FASB’s proposed update, the FASB and the IASB initiated a formal collaboration. This gave
rise to joint proposals aimed at achieving desired objectives of both boards, focusing in particu-
lar on loans held in open portfolios. These were published by the IASB in Supplement to
exposure draft ED/2009/12: ﬁnancial instruments – amortised cost and impairment (IASB
2011a) and by the FASB in Supplementary document: ﬁnancial instruments – impairment
(FASB 2011). These proposals centred on the classiﬁcation of loans into a ‘good book’ and
a ‘bad book’. Expected losses for the ‘good book’ would be recognised over time subject to
a requirement to recognise in full those losses expected to occur in the foreseeable future,
and expected losses for the ‘bad book’ would be recognised in full. These revised proposals
also attracted criticism. Commentators referred to the complexity and burdensome speciﬁc
information requirements of the proposed method, and to the scope for management judgement
in various areas.
4 This prompted the development of further revised proposals involving the
allocation of loans to one of three ‘buckets’, which would differ from each other with regard
to the level of speciﬁcity of the evidence of impairment. At the time of writing, deliberations
towards an agreed accounting standard continue.
5







































































 It should be noted from the above that proposals under consideration have related to an
expected-loss provisioning method applicable to loans in place at the balance-sheet date rather
than to an economic-cycle-based provisioning method.
The events and views summarised above indicate that accounting regulators have had to deal
with a number of difﬁcult issues in their attempts to develop a generally acceptable expected-loss
method of loan-loss provisioning. One source of difﬁculty has been the issue of the extent to
which loan-loss provisioning under such a method should be required to be supported by speciﬁc
objective evidence of likely loss. This difﬁculty arises from the potential for conﬂict between the
preference of accounting regulators that the recognition of losses should be supported by appro-
priate objective evidence and the preference of bankers and others that loan-loss-provisioning
methods should be consistent with banks’ methods of managing credit risk, including with
respect to open portfolios, and should take appropriately prudent account of information relevant
to the estimation of likely loan losses. Evidence relevant to the issue of the extent to which loan-
loss provisioning should be supported by speciﬁc objective evidence of loss can be obtained by
examination of loan-loss provisioning by UK banks before and after the implementation in the
UK in 2005 of IAS 39. IAS 39 introduced stricter requirements than had previously existed in
the UK with regard to the evidence required to support recognition of a loan loss, and it was
believed by some commentators that the imposition of these stricter evidence requirements
adversely affected the quality of loan-loss provisioning. The nature of the loan-loss-provisioning
regime change brought about by IAS 39 in the UK is outlined in Section 2.2.
2.2 UK loan-loss provisioning under IAS 39 and before IAS 39
Up to 2004, loan-loss provisioning by UK banks was in accordance with SORPB and UK GAAP
provisioning requirements reﬂected in the Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting (ASB
1999). For reporting periods starting on or after 1 January 2005, loan-loss provisioning by UK
banks has been in accordance with IAS 39. Although UK unquoted companies continued to
report under UK GAAP after 2004, UK GAAP included FRS 26: Financial instruments: recog-
nition and measurement (ASB 2004) which is essentially identical toIAS 39. (Hereinafter, IAS 39
and FRS 26 are referred to collectively as IAS 39.) I now outline the nature of the change in the
UK loan-loss-provisioning regime brought about by IAS 39.
Extracts from SORPB, the Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting and IAS 39 are
given in Table 1. It is also relevant that, unlike the regimes in some other European countries,
the UK’s SORPB did not adopt the option provided by Article 37 of the European Community’s
Council directive of 8 December 1986 on the annual accounts of consolidated accounts of banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions (86/635/EEC) (Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Communities
1986) (Directive 86/635/EEC), which permitted provisioning in respect of ‘prudence dictated
by particular risks associated with banking’. Therefore, SORPB did not permit economic-
cycle-based loan-loss provisioning. Also, it should be noted from Table 2 that the ‘general’ cat-
egory of the loan-loss allowance under SORPB related to loans that were impaired at the balance-
sheet date but would not be speciﬁcally identiﬁed as such until some time in the future; it did not
relate to economic-cycle-based provisioning. Furthermore, it should be noted that this ‘general’
category did not correspond to the ‘collective’ category under the IAS 39 regime.
6
The extracts provided in Table 1 indicate that both the pre-IAS 39 regime and the IAS 39
regime required that loan-loss expense should only be recognised if a loss had been incurred,
and that both regimes were therefore incurred-loss regimes. They also suggest that the IAS 39
regime imposed stricter requirements regarding the evidence necessary to support recognition
of a loan loss. Some indication as to whether this interpretation is reasonable can be found in








































































 Table 1. Loan-loss provisioning in the UK before IAS 39 and under IAS 39: annotated extracts from
relevant documents.
Before IAS 39 IAS 39
SORPB
‘The balance sheet valuation of advances should
reﬂect any diminution of their ultimate realisable
amount below their cost ...Although speciﬁc and
general provisions are computed separately, they
are in effect components of the same provision. In
total the speciﬁc and general components of a
bank’s provisions for bad and doubtful advances
should represent the aggregate amount by which
the bank considers it necessary to write down its
impaired advances in order to state them at their
expected ultimate net realisable value’.
(paragraph 9)
‘A loan is impaired when, based on current
information and events, the bank considers that the
creditworthiness of a borrower has undergone a
‘An entity shall assess at the end of each reporting
period whether there is any objective evidence
that a ﬁnancial asset or group of ﬁnancial assets
measured at amortised cost is impaired’.
(paragraph 58)
‘A ﬁnancial asset or a group of ﬁnancial assets is
impaired and impairment losses are incurred if,
and only if, there is objective evidence of
impairment as a result of one or more events that
occurred after the initial recognition of the asset
(a “loss event”) and that loss event (or events) has
an impact on the estimated future cash ﬂows of
the ﬁnancial asset or group of ﬁnancial assets that
can be reliably estimated ...Losses expected as a
result of future events, no matter how likely, are
not recognised’. (paragraph 59)
deterioration such that it no longer expects to
recover the advance in full. In these circumstances,
it is necessary to consider whether a speciﬁc
provision should be made against the advance.
Such advances are described in this SORP as
“impaired” ...Although it is often an event of
default that serves as trigger, a provision should be
considered whenever the information available to
the bank suggests that the advance has become
impaired. When an advance has been identiﬁed as
being impaired, the amount of the speciﬁc
provision should be the bank’s estimate of the
amount(if any) needed to reduce the carrying value
to the expected ultimate net realisable value’.
(paragraphs 12 and 13)
IAS 39 allowed that assets could be assessed for
impairment both individually and collectively. It
cited a number of examples of observable
evidence that a ﬁnancial asset had been impaired,
including signiﬁcant ﬁnancial difﬁculty of the
issuer, breach of contract, probability that a
borrower would enter bankruptcy and the
existence of observable data indicating a
measurable decrease in the estimated future cash
ﬂows froma group of ﬁnancial assets. It also gave
examples of events that would not constitute
evidence of impairment:
‘The disappearance of an active market because
an entity’s ﬁnancial instruments are no longer
publicly traded is not evidence of impairment. A
downgrade of an entity’s credit rating is not, of
itself, evidence of impairment, although it may be
evidence of impairment when considered with
other available information. A decline in the fair
value of a ﬁnancial asset below its cost or
amortised cost is not necessarily evidence of
impairment’. (paragraph 60)
‘Experience shows that portfolios of advances often
contain advances which are in fact impaired at the
balance-sheet date, but which will not be
speciﬁcallyidentiﬁed assuch untilsome time in the
future. There will not usually be sufﬁcient
information to hand at the review of advances to be
certain that all impaired advances have been
identiﬁed. To cover the impaired advances which
will only be identiﬁed as such in the future, a
general provision should be made. It is emphasised
that the general provision relates to impairment
already existing in the advances portfolio at the
balance-sheet date. It does not relate to advances
which at the balance-sheet date are subject to no
more than normal credit risk, but which in the
nature of things may become impaired in the
future. Assessment of the appropriate level of
general provision is the responsibility of the
directors and is inevitably subjective’. (paragraphs
17–19)
(Continued)







































































 Affairs into Auditors: market concentration and their role (House of Lords 2011a, 2011b), which
included consideration of the change from the SORPB loan-loss-provisioning regime to the IAS
39 provisioning regime under IFRS. Although evidence to this inquiry reﬂects signiﬁcant diver-
gence of views on the nature and effect of the change from the SORPB regime to the IAS 39
regime, it is largely supportive of the interpretation given above. One witness argued that ‘there
isnomajordifferenceintherequirementsoftheSORPonLoansandAdvances,whichrepresented
UK GAAP on the topic, and IAS 39 under IFRS: both are incurred loss models’ (House of Lords
2011b, p. 236). This view was included in the inquiry’s report (House of Lords 2011a, p. 34).
Another witness observed that, although both the SORPB regime and the IAS 39 regime required
the use of an incurred-loss method, IAS 39 ‘provides more detailed guidance than UK GAAP and
does not distinguish between speciﬁc and general provisions’ (House of Lords 2011b, p. 248).
This witness also expressed the view that the increased requirement for objective evidence
under IAS 39 tended to restrict provisioning. Another witness said that IAS 39 had changed pro-
visioning practice signiﬁcantly in that it ‘had a less prudent loan loss model “incurred loss”, which
did not allow for risk-sensitive loan provisioning where there was as yet no evidence of default’
(House of Lords 2011b, p. 25). Another witness said that ‘even though the old UK GAAP SORP
Before IAS 39 IAS 39
Statement of principles for ﬁnancial reporting
‘Nor is it appropriate to use prudence as a reason
for, for example, creating hidden reserves or
excessive provisions, deliberately understating
assets or gains, or deliberately overstating
liabilities or losses, because that would mean that
the ﬁnancial statements are not neutral and,
therefore, not reliable’. (paragraph 3.20)
Extensive application guidance given in paragraphs
AG84 to AG93 includes more detailed guidance
on what can and cannot be regarded as evidence
of impairment. An example of this guidance is the
following, which refers to assets that are
collectively assessed for impairment:
‘As an example ..., an entity may determine, on
the basis of historical experience, that one of the
main causes of default on credit card loans is the
death of the borrower. The entity may observe
that the death rate is unchanged from one year to
the next. Nevertheless, some of the borrowers in
the entity’s group of credit card loans may have
died in that year, indicating that an impairment
loss has occurred on those loans, even if, at the
year-end, the entity is not yet aware which
speciﬁc borrowers have died. It would be
appropriate for an impairment loss to be
recognised for these “incurred but not reported”
losses. However, it would not be appropriate to
recognise an impairment loss for deaths that are
expected to occur in a future period, because the
necessary loss event (the death of the borrower)
has not yet occurred’. (paragraph AG90)
‘If there is objective evidence that an impairment
loss on ﬁnancial assets measured at amortised
cost has been incurred, the amount of the loss is
measured as the difference between the asset’s
carrying amount and the present value of
estimated future cash ﬂows (excluding future
credit losses that have not been incurred)
discounted at the ﬁnancial asset’s original
effective interest rate’. (paragraph 63)









































































 approach to loss provisioning may have been far from perfect, it still allowed scope for more
reasonable and prudent provisioning than has been possible under IFRS’ (House of Lords
2011b, p. 326). After referring to the general provisioning that was permitted under SORPB,
this witness also said that ‘the introduction of IFRS removed even that limited ability to make
prudent general provisions by imposing a model that strictly limited incurred losses to those
Table 2. Data used in the analysis.
Panel A: construction of the data set
All banks listed on any of the monthly lists of ‘Banks Incorporated in the United Kingdom’
published by the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority plus any UK companies
described as banks by the Perfect Information Filings database at any time from December
2001 to August 2009, with ﬁnancial statements available from Perfect Information Filings
and/or Thomson Research 58
Less: banks that are subsidiaries of other UK banks in the data set 213
45
Less: banks for which ﬁnancial statements are only available for 1 or 2 years 28
Number of banks in the data set 37
Number of bank-years for which accounting data were collected for years from 2000 to 2009
inclusive
292
Less: cases for which data items required for this analysis were unavailable 26
Cases for which ﬁnancial statements were obtained 286
Less: cases lost due to the need for lagged loan-loss expense data for the ﬁrst year 237
Less: cases lost due to the need for next-year recoveries data in the last year 237
Number of bank-year cases in the data set used in the analysis 212
Panel B: summary statistics for banks used in the analysis
Bank-years Mean Median
All banks in the data set
Total assets (in billions of UK pounds) 212 151.16 12.69
Book equity/total assets (opening) 212 10.07% 5.78%
Loans/total assets 212 72.05% 72.91%
Loan-loss allowance/loans (see note) 212 1.57% 0.87%
Loan-loss expense/proﬁt on ordinary activities (absolute values) 212 45.42% 24.03%
Banks with a stock market quotation
Total assets (in billions of UK pounds) 81 383.20 221.63
Book equity/total assets (opening) 81 5.74% 3.79%
Loans/total assets 81 67.63% 65.31%
Loan-loss allowance/loans 81 0.90% 0.82%
Loan-loss expense/proﬁt on ordinary activities (absolute values) 81 44.34% 25.58%
Banks without a stock market quotation
Total assets (in billions of UK pounds) 131 7.68 4.53
Book equity/total assets (opening) 131 12.74% 7.70%
Loans/total assets 131 74.78% 78.39%
Loan-loss allowance/loans 131 1.99% 0.89%
Loan-loss expense/proﬁt on ordinary activities (absolute values) 131 46.09% 20.39%
Notes: The mean values for book equity/total assets (opening) are for the winsorised data used in the regression models, as
also reported in Table 3. Proﬁt on ordinary activities is stated before loan-loss expense. The mean (median) values of loan-
loss allowance as a proportion of loans before IAS 39 and under IAS 39 are 1.76% (0.93%) and 1.18% (0.74%),
respectively. Differences between the loan-loss allowance/loans before IAS 39 and under IAS 39 are not signiﬁcant at
the 10% level.







































































 that had occurred’ (House of Lords 2011b, p. 326). Another witness disputed claims that the
SORPB regime was a pure incurred-loss regime, and characterised the IAS 39 and SORPB
regimes as follows: ‘If there is a spectrum from incurred loss to expected loss, IFRS is at one
extreme, Spanish economic cycle provisioning at the other, and “UK GAAP” (Companies Act
Rules, including the SORP) was somewhere between’ (House of Lords 2011b, p. 108).
The extracts included in Table 1 and the inquiry evidence quoted above are largely supportive
of the view that the SORPB loan-loss-provisioning regime and the IAS 39 regime are both
incurred-loss regimes and that the IAS 39 regime has a stricter evidence requirement than the
SORPB regime with regard to the recognition of a loss. They also indicate that some commenta-
tors believe that the stricter evidence requirement adversely affects the quality of loan-loss pro-
visioning. Comparison of the quality of loan-loss provisioning under the SORPB regime and
the IAS 39 regime can provide evidence relevant to the question arising within recent account-
ing-regulatory debate regarding the degree of objective evidence that should be required to
support recognition of a loan loss. In this paper, I examine whether loan-loss provisioning by
UK banks was less timely under the stricter evidence requirements of the IAS 39 regime than
under the less-strict evidence requirements of the UK’s previous SORPB regime.
The number of observations in the UK data set used in this analysis is small relative to the
number that would have been available for an analysis based on a large number of European
countries. A disadvantage of using this relatively small data set is that it limits the strength of
the inferences that can be drawn. However, there is also a signiﬁcant advantage in using this
UK data set in this context. There were some signiﬁcant differences between pre-IAS 39 provi-
sioning regimes across Europe. An example of a source of such differences was the European
Communities’ Directive 86/635/EEC, referred to above, which permitted but did not require pro-
visioning in respect of ‘prudence dictated by particular risks associated with banking’.
7 The UK
data used in this paper are all drawn from a single setting for which the UK House of Lords
enquiry referred to above provides an unusually detailed formal documentation of the nature
of the regime change. A study involving examination of pre- and post-IAS 39 loan-loss provision-
ing in a large number of European countries would not beneﬁt from such formally documented
detail for all countries. The ability to provide, as in the preceding paragraphs, a clear statement
of the precise nature of the regime change that is being examined facilitates interpretation of
the results in the context of debate on further potential changes in the accounting for loan-losses.
2.3 Some US evidence on the impact of a more restrictive evidence requirement for loan-
loss provisioning
Evidence on the effect of imposing a stricter evidence requirement with regard to loan-loss pro-
visioning can be found in a US study by Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2012). They examine the
association between loan-loss provisioning and write-offs in US banks before and after the issue
of SAB 102 and associated guidance, which were seen as imposing a stricter evidence require-
ment in respect of loan-loss provisioning and thereby reducing the opportunities for earnings
management.
8Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2012) report evidence that relatively large banks
and relatively strong banks relied to a greater degree after SAB 102 than before on past loan
write-offs as support for loan-loss allowances. Of particular relevance to this study, they also
report that, for relatively strong banks, the association between write-offs and past allowances
became greater after SAB 102 than before. This is consistent with the more restrictive regime
imposed by the SAB 102 guidance in conjunction with the relative stability of strong banks
diminishing the extent of earnings management in those banks and thereby improving the








































































 3. Research design
This paper seeks evidence on whether loan-loss provisioning by UK banks was less timely under
the stricter evidence requirements of the IAS 39 incurred-loss regime than under the less-strict
evidence requirements of the previous UK incurred-loss regime. The difference between the time-
liness of provisioning under the two regimes is measured by reference to the relationship in time
between loan write-offs and loan-loss expense. The rationale for this is that the relationship in
time between loan write-offs and loan-loss expense relates directly to commentators’ concerns
that the restrictive evidence requirements of the incurred-loss method cause delay in the recog-
nition of predictable loan losses, and that imposition of stricter evidence requirements tends to
exacerbate the delay. In the extreme case of such delay, loan losses would be recognised only
when the associated loans are deemed to be beyond any realistic prospect of recovery and are
written off. In this case, 100% of loan losses recognised within the loan-loss expense of the
current year would be associated with current-year loan write-offs and 0% of previously recog-
nised loan losses would be associated with current-year write-offs. Assuming that all loan
write-offs relate to loans for which loan-loss expense is recognised either in the current year or
in the previous year, a 100%/0% combination of ratios would indicate a less timely loan-loss-pro-
visioning regime than a 70%/30% combination of ratios. With a 70%/30% combination, there
would be some recognition in year t21 of losses in respect of loans deemed in year t to be
beyond realistic prospect of recovery, whereas there would be no such recognition under a
100%/0% regime. Provisioning under a regime with an 80%/20% (60%/40%) combination of
ratios would be deemed to be less (more) timely than provisioning under the regime with a
70%/30% combination of ratios.
9
Following on from this, evidence as to whether loan-loss provisioning was less timely under
IAS 39 than before IAS 39 is obtained by estimating regression models where scaled loan write-
off is the dependent variable and the similarly scaled current-year loan-loss expense and previous-
year loan-loss expense are explanatory variables. The coefﬁcients on the current-year loan-loss
expense and the previous-year loan-loss expense can be interpreted as the proportions of those
loan-loss expenses that are reﬂected in current-year loan write-offs. The difference between the
coefﬁcient for the current-year loan-loss expense under IAS 39 and before IAS 39 and the differ-
ence between the coefﬁcient for the previous-year loan-loss expense under IAS 39 and before IAS
39 are the indicators of the difference between the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning under IAS
39 and its timeliness before IAS 39. This approach has some similarity with approaches used by
Cantrell et al. (2011) and Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2012) to examine the association between
loan-loss allowances and future loan losses.
3.1 Was loan-loss provisioning less timely under IAS 39 than before IAS 39?
In examining whether loan-loss provisioning was less timely under IAS 39 than before IAS 39, I
estimate three regression models using observations from 2001 to 2008. All of these models have
current-year write-offs as the dependent variable and current-year loan-loss expense and pre-
vious-year loan-loss expense as the explanatory variables.
10 These three regression models
each include a number of control variables. The change in non-performing loans is included in
order to control for changes in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios. This variable has been
used in a number of earlier studies for related purposes. See, for example, Ahmed et al. (1999)
and Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011). The proﬁt on ordinary activities before loan-loss
expense is included in order to control for possible effects of any earnings-smoothing activity.
Again, this variable has been used in a number of earlier studies for related purposes. See, for
example, Ahmed et al. (1999), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and Gebhardt and Novotny-







































































 Farkas (2011). In order to control for effects related to regulatory capital and in light of the non-
availability of regulatory-capital data for many of the smaller banks in the data set, the ratio of
opening equity to opening total assets is included. Bank controls are included in light of the possi-
bility that banks might have adopted different write-off policies. Calendar-year controls for years
from 2002 to 2005 are included in order to control for time-varying macro-economic effects other
than those captured by the segregation of the post-IAS 39 interval and the segregation in one
regression model of accounting years ended in the second half of 2008. In order to observe the
impact of control variables on the coefﬁcients for the explanatory variables, I also report the
results from estimation of the regression models without the control variables.
First, in order to provide preliminary evidence on the relationship in time between loan write-
offs and current-year and previous-year loan-loss expense, I estimate regression model (1), which
does not partition the data with respect to whether or not IAS 39 was in force. Regression model
(1) is as follows:







d1,jYear Controljit + 11,it,
(1)
where WOit is the loan write-off for bank i for year t, divided by the average of the opening and
closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; LLEit (LLEi,t21) is the loan-loss
expense for bank i for year t (t21), divided by the average of the opening and closing balance-
sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; CHNPLitis a control variable equal to the proportionate
change in a measure of the non-performing loans of bank i during year t;
11 EARNit is a control vari-
able equal to the proﬁt onordinary activities of bank ifor year t(before loan-loss expense) divided by
theaverageofopeningandclosingloansofbankiforyeart;EQAS S i,t21isacontrolvariableequalto
theratioof equitytototal assets intheopeningbalancesheetof bankiforyeart;BankControljitisthe
value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for bank j,w h e r eb i st h en u m b e ro fb a n k s ;
Year Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for calendar year j;t h e
b, g and d terms are regression coefﬁcients;the 1 term is an error term. Bothwrite-offs and loan-loss
expensearestatedgrossofrecoveriesofloanswritten-offinpreviousyears.InlightofevidenceinLiu
andRyan(2006)thatUSbanksmayhaveoverstatedloanwrite-offsinordertohelpconcealexcessive
loan-loss expensing, loan write-offs are stated net of next-year recoveries. For this and all other
regression models, p-values are based on White standard errors that are robust to clustering by bank.
The principal evidence reported in this paper is based on regression model (2). This includes
an indicator variable in respect of years where IAS 39 was in force for the previous year. This
allows comparison of coefﬁcients under IAS 39 and coefﬁcients before IAS 39, and thereby pro-
vides evidence on whether loan-loss provisioning was less timely under IAS 39 than before IAS
39. Regression model (2) is as follows:
WOit = b2,1 + b2,2LLEit + b2,3LLEi,t−1 + b2,4DIit + b2,5LLEit × DIit + b2,6LLEi,t−1 × DIit
















































































 where DIit is an indicator variable equal to one where bank i applied IAS 39 in year t21, and zero
otherwise; and the other notation is as previously deﬁned. The coefﬁcient b2,5 can be interpreted
as the excess of the coefﬁcient for write-offs with respect to current-year loan-loss expense under
IAS 39 over the corresponding coefﬁcient before IAS 39. Similarly, the coefﬁcient b2,6 can be
interpreted as the excess of the coefﬁcient for write-offs with respect to previous-year loan-loss
expense under IAS 39 over the corresponding coefﬁcient before IAS 39. For each of the coefﬁ-
cients b2,5 and b2,6, I conduct a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient is equal to
zero against the alternative hypothesis that it is not equal to zero. If IAS 39 made loan-loss pro-
visioning less timely, estimation of model 2 would give b2,5.0 and b2,6 , 0. However, if IAS 39
made loan-loss provisioning more timely, estimation of model 2 would give b2,5 , 0 and b2,6 .
0. Finally, if IAS 39 gave rise to a neutral change with no signiﬁcant impact on the timeliness of
loan-loss provisioning, b2,5 and b2,6 would both be insigniﬁcantly different from zero.
In light of concern that the IAS 39 incurred-loss method may have been particularly damaging
in delaying the recognition of predictable loan losses until the onset of the ﬁnancial and banking
crisis of the late 2000s, I also estimate regression model (3). This includes the IAS 39 indicator
variable included in regression model (2). It also includes an additional indicator variable in
respect of cases where the accounting year ended in the second half of 2008, when the UK
effects of the ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s became particularly severe as evi-
denced by the annual rate of UK GDP growth falling below zero. Regression model (3) is as
follows:
WOit = b3,1 + b3,2LLEit + b3,3LLEi,t−1 + b3,4DIit + b3,5LLEit × DIit
+ b3,6LLEi,t−1 × DIit + b3,7DIit × DFit + b3,8LLEit × DIit × DFit







d3,jYear Controljit + 13,it,
(3)
where DFit is an indicator variable equal to one for accounting years ended in the second half of
2008 and zero otherwise; and the other notation is as previously deﬁned. From regression model
(3), the coefﬁcient b3,5 (b3,6) can be interpreted as the excess of the coefﬁcient for LLEit
(LLEi,t21) under IAS 39 for accounting years other than those ended in the second half of
2008 over the corresponding coefﬁcient before IAS 39. As for b2,5 and b2,6, I conduct for
each of the coefﬁcients b3,5 and b3,6a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient
is equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis that it is not equal to zero. The coefﬁcient
b3,8 (b3,9) can be interpreted as the excess of the coefﬁcient for LLEit (LLEi,t21) under IAS 39
for accounting years ended in the second half of 2008 over the corresponding coefﬁcient for pre-
vious years under IAS 39. I also conduct for each of these two coefﬁcients a two-tailed test of the
null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient is equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis that it is not
equal to zero. b3,8 . 0 and b3,9 , 0( b3,8 , 0 and b3,9 . 0) would indicate that loan-loss pro-
visioning was less timely (more timely) immediately prior to accounting years ended in the
second half of 2008 than it had been previously under IAS 39.
3.2 Did general provisioning enhance the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning before IAS
39?
One of the effects of IAS 39 in the UK was to eliminate general loan-loss provisioning, which
provided a means for reﬂecting in loan-loss expense evidence of a relatively non-speciﬁc and







































































 judgemental nature with regard to likely loan losses. Data for accounting years ended in 2001–
2005, for which general provisioning could have occurred in the previous accounting year, are
therefore examined for evidence of greater timeliness in the general-provision element of the
loan-loss expense than in the speciﬁc-provision element. This examination is carried out using
a regression model that includes the general-provision element of the previous-year loan-loss
expense as a separate explanatory variable.
12 The regression model is as follows:







d4,jYear Controljit + 14,it,
(4)
where LLEGENi,t21 is the general-provision element of the loan-loss expense (gross of
recoveries) for bank i for year t21, divided by the average of the opening and closing
balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; and other notation is as previously
deﬁned. The principal object of interest here is the estimate of the coefﬁcient b4,4. This can
be interpreted as the excess of the coefﬁcient for the previous-year general-provision element
of the loan-loss expense over the coefﬁcient for the previous-year speciﬁc-provision
element. I conduct for this coefﬁcient a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient
is equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis that it is not equal to zero. b4,4 . 0( b4,4 , 0)
would indicate that the general-provision element was more timely (less timely) than the
speciﬁc-provision element. Regression model (1) is also estimated for the data for which
regression model (4) is estimated.
3.3 Partitioning of the data set
The data set used in this paper comprises 37 UK banks, including 12 banks that had a UK stock
market quotation at some time during the interval examined and 25 other UK banks which, in
many cases, were UK subsidiaries of non-UK banks. The banks in the ﬁrst subset differ from
those in the second subset in that they are bank holding companies subject to more direct regu-
latory oversight and are usually much larger. The banks in the ﬁrst subset may have differed from
those in the second subset in their incentives and ability to deploy relatively sophisticated
approaches to loan-loss provisioning in response to the implementation of IAS 39 and any
other contemporaneous regulatory inﬂuences. In light of the potential difference between the
two subsets of banks, all regression models are estimated separately for (i) all 37 banks together,
(ii) the 12 banks that had a UK stock market quotation at some time during the interval examined
and (iii) the 25 other banks.
4. Data
Details of the data used in the analysis are provided in Table 2. The analysis uses yearly account-
ing data for years from 2001 to 2008. As reported in Table 2 Panel A, data collection commenced
with the identiﬁcation for the interval from December 2001 to August 2009 of all banks included
in the monthly lists of ‘Banks Incorporated in the United Kingdom’ published by the UK Finan-
cial Services Authority and all UK companies described as banks by the Perfect Information
Filings database for which ﬁnancial statements are available from Perfect Information Filings








































































 all cases they were subsidiaries of other banks included in the data set. A further 8 banks are elimi-
nated because ﬁnancial statements are available for only 1 or 2 years. This gives 37 banks for
which 292 bank-year cases from 2001 to 2009 are available. Of these 292 cases, 6 cases are
lost due to the non-availability of data items required for the analysis, and a total of 74 cases
are lost because of the need for lagged loan-loss-expense data and next-year recoveries data.
This leaves 212 cases. For some parts of the analysis, the data set is subdivided into those
banks that had a UK quotation during part of the interval covered by the analysis and those
that did not. The former subset comprises 12 banks with 81 bank-year cases; the latter subset com-
prises 25 banks with 131 bank-year cases.
13
Table 2 Panel B provides summary statistics for the banks in the data set. The loan-loss
expense is a material component of earnings: for the whole data set, the mean (median) of the
absolute value of loan-loss expense as a proportion of the absolute value of proﬁt on ordinary
activities before loan-loss expense is 45.42% (24.03%); the corresponding ﬁgures for the
banks with and without a stock market quotation are 44.34% (25.58%) and 46.09% (20.39%),
respectively. Also, as reported in a note to Table 2, the mean and median values of the loan-
loss allowance as a proportion of loans are larger before IAS 39 than under IAS 39, but the differ-
ences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
All data used in this paper are hand-collected from annual ﬁnancial statements, by reference
to notes on the movements in the loan-loss allowance account. Loans are deﬁned as those items
that are classiﬁed on banks’ balance sheets as loans and advances to customers or banks. The
loan-loss allowance account and all movements therein examined in this paper are in respect of
items deﬁned as loans. Data are summarised by the author in accordance with the structure
depicted in Figure 1, which shows how the beginning-of-year and end-of-year balances on
the loan-loss allowance account articulate with the various movements in the account. Collec-
tion of data on write-offs, loan-loss expense and recoveries within this structure ensures that
these data are internally consistent and complete.
14 Write-offs for year t, loan-loss expense
for year t and loan loss-expense for year t21 are all divided by the average of opening and
closing loans (gross of the loan-loss allowance) for year t21. Unlike with US banks, there is
the potential for signiﬁcant inconsistency both across banks and across time with regard to
what is reported as non-performing loans by UK banks during the interval examined. This is
indicated by Frost (2004, p. 379) and is also evident from examination of the ﬁnancial state-
ments of UK banks in the data set. In order to deal with this inconsistency, the change in
non-performing loans is measured as the proportionate change in a measure of non-performing
loans as a percentage of loans between the opening and closing balance-sheet dates, where
opening and closing data for each bank-year case are all collected from the same set of
annual ﬁnancial statements. Where available, impaired loans as reported by Bankscope are
used as the starting point for this exercise. In some cases no disclosure corresponding to
non-performing loans is identiﬁed, and in some cases the ratio of proportions gives rise to an
extreme value. In cases of no identiﬁable disclosure, the change in non-performing loans is
set equal to zero; extreme values are dealt with by winsorising the item at the lower decile
(240%) and the upper decile (+68%). Proﬁt on ordinary activities before loan-loss expense
is measured before tax and is divided by the average of opening and closing loans. The ratio
of opening equity to opening total assets is measured as the opening book value of equity
divided by opening total assets before subtracting the loan-loss allowance. With the exception
of change in non-performing loans, all continuous variables are winsorised at the 5th and 95th
percentile.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression models. Table 4
reports the correlation matrix for the variables.








































































5.1 Was loan-loss provisioning less timely under IAS 39 than before IAS 39?
Table 5 reports the results from estimation of regression models (1), (2) and (3), both without
control variables and with control variables. All models are estimated separately for: (i) all
banks (all) (Panel A); (ii) the subset of banks which had a UK stock market quotation at any
time during the interval covered by the analysis (quoted) (Panel B); (iii) the subset of banks
which did not have a UK stock market quotation at any time during the interval covered by
the analysis (unquoted) (Panel C). For each regression coefﬁcient reported in the table, the p-
value for a two-tailed test is reported in parentheses.
Figure 1. Movements in the loan-loss allowance account.
Note: From information available in UK published ﬁnancial statements, the categories of movement in the
loan-loss allowance account described above can all be identiﬁed throughout the interval examined in this
paper. Before the implementation of IAS 39, UK banks were required to disclose separately the movements
on the speciﬁc and general components of the loan-loss allowance account. IAS 39 abolished general pro-
visioning and introduced an individual/collective classiﬁcation for loan-loss allowances. The standard did
not require movements in the individual and collective components of the allowance to be separately dis-
























































































All banks in the data set
Write-off (as a percentage of
lagged loans)
212 0.48 0.62 20.02 0.01 0.27 0.66 2.31
Loan-loss expense (as a percentage of lagged loans):
All cases: total expense 212 0.59 0.81 20.40 0.03 0.37 0.84 3.07
Pre-IAS 39: lagged expense
(total)
143 0.46 0.61 20.37 0.03 0.30 0.76 2.10
Pre-IAS 39: lagged expense
(general)
143 0.00 0.10 20.28 20.01 0.00 0.03 0.17
Change in non-performing
loans
212 1.86 27.42 240.00 212.06 0.00 2.70 68.00
Proﬁt on ordinary activities
(as a percentage of loans)
212 1.82 1.32 21.02 0.97 1.82 2.69 4.55
Equity as a percentage of total
assets (opening)
212 10.07 10.08 1.90 3.74 5.78 11.01 37.98
Banks with a stock market quotation
Write-off (as a percentage of
lagged loans)
81 0.44 0.38 20.02 0.16 0.36 0.59 1.50
Loan-loss expense (as a percentage of lagged loans):
All cases: total expense 81 0.61 0.45 0.00 0.26 0.56 0.82 2.17
Pre-IAS 39: lagged expense
(total)
49 0.43 0.29 0.01 0.21 0.42 0.60 1.20
Pre-IAS 39: lagged expense
(general)
49 0.01 0.06 20.28 20.01 0.01 0.03 0.14
Change in non-performing
loans
81 2.15 27.22 240.00 213.48 21.51 11.59 68.00
Proﬁt on ordinary activities
(as a percentage of loans)
81 1.69 1.22 21.02 1.00 1.90 2.65 3.68
Equity as a percentage of total
assets (opening)
81 5.74 7.08 1.90 3.13 3.79 5.68 37.98
Banks without a stock market quotation
Write-off (as a percentage of
lagged loans)
131 0.51 0.73 20.02 0.00 0.10 0.80 2.31
Loan-loss expense (as a percentage of lagged loans):
All cases: total expense 131 0.57 0.96 20.40 0.00 0.14 0.95 3.07
Pre-IAS 39: lagged expense
(total)
94 0.47 0.73 20.37 0.00 0.14 0.86 2.10
Pre-IAS 39: lagged expense
(general)
94 0.00 0.11 20.28 20.01 0.00 0.04 0.17
Change in non-performing
loans
131 1.68 27.64 240.00 26.89 0.00 0.00 68.00
Proﬁt on ordinary activities
(as a percentage of loans)
131 1.90 1.38 21.02 0.95 1.69 2.74 4.55
Equity as a percentage of total
assets (opening)
131 12.74 10.74 1.90 5.30 7.70 21.34 37.98
Notes: Statistics are for the bank-yearcases used in the analysis (after winsorisation). All are expressed as percentages. The
items for which statistics are provided are as follows: write-off (as a percentage of lagged loans) is the loan write-off (gross
of current year recoveries and net of next-year recoveries) for bank i for year t as a percentage of the average of the opening
and closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; loan-loss expense (as a percentage of lagged loans) is the
loan-loss expense (gross of recoveries) for bank i for year t as a percentage of the average of the opening and closing
balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; change in non-performing loans is the percentage change in a
measure of the non-performing loans of bank i during year t; proﬁt on ordinary activities is the proﬁt on ordinary
activities of bank i for year t (before loan-loss expense) as a percentage of the average of opening and closing loans of
bank i for year t; equity as a percentage of total assets (opening) is the equity as a percentage of total assets in the
opening balance sheet of bank i for year t.







































































 It should be noted that the implementation of IAS 39 by UK banks pre-dated by only 3 years
the implementation in the UK in 2008 of the Basel II framework (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2006). Any change in the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning after the implemen-
tation of IAS 39 may therefore have been due in part to effects arising from the development
of this framework. Inferences regarding the effect of IAS 39 itself should be qualiﬁed in light
of this.
From regression model (1), for the full set of banks and for each of the two subsets, the b1,2
coefﬁcient (in respect of current-year loan-loss expense) and the b1,3 coefﬁcient (in respect of pre-
vious-year loan-loss expense) are all positive but are not always signiﬁcantly different from zero
at the 5% level. In all cases, the sum of the b1,2 and b1,3 coefﬁcients is in the range 63% to 101%,
consistent with most of the loan-loss expense of a year relating to loans that are written off in
either the current year or the following year. In all cases b1,3 . b1,2.
The principal focus of interest in this analysis is the output from estimation of regression
model (2). Here, the principal objects of interest are the estimates of the coefﬁcients b2,5 and
b2,6, which indicate whether loan-loss provisioning under IAS 39 was less timely than loan-
loss provisioning before IAS 39. Speciﬁcally, b2,5 . 0a n db2,6 , 0( b2,5 , 0a n db2,6 . 0)
would indicate that loan-loss provisioning under IAS 39 was less timely (more timely) than
loan-loss provisioning before IAS 39. In all six cases (all, quoted, unquoted; without control
variables and with control variables), the coefﬁcient b2,5 (b2,6) is negative (positive), which
is indicative of greater timeliness under IAS 39 than before IAS 39. However, most of the coef-
ﬁcients are not signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level. The exceptions are: b2,6 (all,
without controls) ¼ 0.4996 (p-value 0.043); b2,5 (quoted, without controls) ¼ 20.7698 (p-
value , 0.001); b2,5 (quoted, with controls) ¼ 20.7857 (p-value 0.001); b2,6 (quoted,
without controls) ¼ 0.5865 (p-value 0.002); b2,6 (quoted, with controls) ¼ 0.6605 (p-value
, 0.001). The evidence that provisioning became more timely under IAS 39 is stronger for
the quoted subset, where all b2,5 (b2,6) coefﬁcients are negative (positive) and signiﬁcantly
different from zero, than for the data set as a whole and for the unquoted subset. This could
reﬂect the quoted banks’ greater incentives and ability to deploy relatively sophisticated
approaches to loan-loss provisioning in response to IAS 39 and any other regulatory inﬂuences
at around the time that IAS 39 was introduced. However, the inferences that can be drawn from
the quoted subset of banks should be qualiﬁed in light of the relatively small number of cases
(81) in this subset.
Table 4. Correlation matrix.
WOit LLEit LLEi,t21 NPLit EARNit EQASSi,t21
WOit 1.00 0.68 0.75 0.02 0.58 0.01
LLEit 0.72 1.00 0.74 0.24 0.39 20.14
LLEi,t21 0.75 0.81 1.00 0.07 0.46 20.08
CHNPLit 20.05 0.20 0.07 1.00 20.14 20.13
EARNit 0.57 0.41 0.46 20.16 1.00 0.32
EQASSi,t21 0.11 20.09 20.11 20.18 0.14 1.00
Notes: Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefﬁcients are below (above) the diagonal. Data are for UK banks from 2001 to
2008 (37 banks; 212 cases). WOit is the loan write-off (gross of current-year recoveries and net of next-year recoveries) for
bank i for year t, divided by the average of the opening and closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21;
LLEit (LLEi,t21) is the loan-loss expense (gross of recoveries) for bank i for year t (t21), divided by the average of the
opening and closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; CHNPLit is the proportionate change in a
measure of the non-performing loans of bank i during accounting year t; EARNit is the proﬁt on ordinary activities of
bank i for year t (before loan-loss expense) divided by the average of opening and closing loans of bank i for year t;








































































 Table 5. Tests of timeliness of loan-loss expense relative to write-offs.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Without controls With controls Without controls With controls Without controls With controls
Panel A: All banks in the data set (37 banks; 212 cases)
Intercept (bn,1) 0.0010 (0.159) 20.0020 (0.411) 0.0016 (0.090) 20.0021 (0.423) 0.0016 (0.092) 20.0022 (0.394)
LLEit (bn,2) 0.2453 (0.046) 0.2464 (0.040) 0.3253 (0.057) 0.2945 (0.111) 0.3252 (0.058) 0.2942 (0.111)
LLEi,t21 (bn,3) 0.5224 (0.002) 0.4860 (0.002) 0.3769 (0.066) 0.4101 (0.019) 0.3769 (0.068) 0.4146 (0.023)
DIit (bn,4) 20.0018 (0.052) 20.0012 (0.202) 20.0018 (0.052) 20.0013 (0.206)
LLEit × DIit (bn,5) 20.2306 (0.238) 20.1404 (0.479) 20.1551 (0.576) 20.2034 (0.431)
LLEi,t21 × DIit (bn,6) 0.4996 (0.043) 0.3678 (0.172) 0.4230 (0.220) 0.4617 (0.205)
DIit × DFit (bn,7) 20.0004 (0.620) 0.0006 (0.644)
LLEit × DIit × DFit (bn,8) 20.0609 (0.708) 0.0468 (0.849)
LLEi,t21 × DIit × DFit (bn,9) 0.0291 (0.895) 20.1151 (0.749)
CHNPLit (bn,10) 20.0001 (0.460) 20.0003 (0.704) 20.0004 (0.644)
EARNit (bn,11) 0.1393 (0.012) 0.1411 (0.007) 0.1422 (0.006)
EQASSi,t21 (bn,12) 0.0157 (0.022) 0.0121 (0.033) 0.0128 (0.020)
Adjusted R
2 59.0% 76.8% 60.6% 77.2% 60.1% 76.9%
Panel B: Banks with a stock market quotation (12 banks; 81 cases)
Intercept (bn,1) 20.0004 (0.017) 0.0035 (0.016) 20.0010 (0.012) 0.0002 (0.881) 20.001 (0.013) 0.0005 (0.720)
LLEit (bn,2) 0.2430 (0.099) 0.2992 (0.149) 0.8278 (,0.001) 0.8688 (,0.001) 0.8278 (,0.001) 0.8799 (,0.001)
LLEi,t21 (bn,3) 0.7663 (0.001) 0.3333 (0.101) 0.2966 (0.055) 0.1172 (0.075) 0.2967 (0.060) 0.1081 (0.059)
DIit (bn,4) 0.0008 (0.204) 0.0013 (0.009) 0.0008 (0.128) 0.0012 (0.045)
LLEit × DIit (bn,5) 20.7698 (,0.001) 20.7857 (0.001) 20.6859 (0.003) 20.5895 (0.003)
LLEi,t21 × DIit (bn,6) 0.5865 (0.002) 0.6605 (,0.001) 0.5055 (0.041) 0.4173 (0.027)
DIit × DFit (bn,7) 20.0010 (0.267) 20.0004 (0.822)
LLEit × DIit × DFit (bn,8) 20.0252 (0.907) 20.2000 (0.130)
LLEi,t21 × DIit × DFit (bn,9) 0.0575 (0.796) 0.2846 (0.101)
CHNPLit (bn,10) 20.0012 (0.204) 20.0012 (0.063) 20.0012 (0.044)
EARNit (bn,11) 0.0302 (0.288) 0.0001 (0.999) 20.0024 (0.946)
EQASSi,t21 (bn,12) 20.0079 (0.155) 0.0007 (0.883) 20.0055 (0.617)
Adjusted R







































































































 Table 5. Continued.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Without controls With controls Without controls With controls Without controls With controls
Panel C: Banks without a stock market quotation (25 banks; 131 cases)
Intercept (bn,1) 0.0014 (0.152) 20.0030 (0.325) 0.0020 (0.120) 20.0022 (0.495) 0.0020 (0.124) 20.0025 (0.396)
LLEit (bn,2) 0.2606 (0.076) 0.2427 (0.092) 0.2952 (0.111) 0.2379 (0.232) 0.2952 (0.116) 0.2331 (0.233)
LLEi,t21 (bn,3) 0.4727 (0.015) 0.5261 (0.002) 0.3764 (0.098) 0.4426 (0.014) 0.3765 (0.102) 0.4449 (0.019)
DIit (bn,4) 20.0021 (0.087) 20.0022 (0.129) 20.0020 (0.087) 20.0028 (0.099)
LLEit × DIit (bn,5) 20.1742 (0.460) 20.0356 (0.872) 20.0958 (0.786) 20.3110 (0.285)
LLEi,t21 × DIit (bn,6) 0.4748 (0.126) 0.3387 (0.289) 0.3905 (0.385) 0.7425 (0.120)
DIit × DFit (bn,7) 20.0002 (0.813) 0.0018 (0.439)
LLEit × DIit × DFit (bn,8) 20.0756 (0.741) 0.2674 (0.465)
LLEi,t21 × DIit × DFit (bn,9) 0.0393 (0.903) 20.4852 (0.394)
CHNPLit (bn,10) 20.0014 (0.268) 20.0008 (0.452) 20.0013 (0.368)
EARNit (bn,11) 0.1802 (0.009) 0.1979 (0.005) 0.2050 (0.002)
EQASSi,t21 (bn,12) 0.0196 (0.016) 0.0120 (0.097) 0.0115 (0.139)
Adjusted R



















































































 Table 5. Continued
Notes: Regression models (1), (2) and (3) are estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series yearly data for UK banks from 2001 to 2008. The models are as follows:







d1,jYear Controljit + 11,it
(1)







d2,jYear Controljit + 12,it,
(2)










where WOit is the loan write-off (gross of current-year recoveries and net of next-year recoveries) for bank i for year t, divided by the average of the opening and
closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; LLEit (LLEi,t21) is the loan-loss expense (gross of recoveries) for bank i for year t (t21), divided by
the average of the opening and closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; CHNPLit is a control variable equal to the proportionate change in a
measure of the non-performing loans of bank i during year t; EARNit is a control variable equal to the proﬁt on ordinary activities of bank i for year t (before loan-
loss expense) divided by the average of opening and closing loans of bank i for year t; EQASSi,t21 is a control variable equal to the ratio of equity to total assets in
the opening balance sheet of bank i for year t; Bank Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for bank j, where b is the number of
banks; Year Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for calendar year j;D I it is an indicator variable equal to one where bank i
applied IAS 39 for year t21, and zero otherwise; DFit is an indicator variable equal to one for accounting years ended in the second half of 2008, when the effects
of the ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s became particularly severe; the b, g and d terms are regression coefﬁcients; the 1 terms are error terms.
Coefﬁcients for bank controls and calendar-year controls are not reported. p-Values for a two-tailed test are given in parentheses. p-Values are based on White






































































































 Regression model (3) includes post-IAS 39 interaction terms and interaction terms for
accounting years ended in the second half of 2008. The coefﬁcients b3,5 and b3,6 are all of the
same sign as the corresponding b2,5 and b2,6 coefﬁcients. With one exception, the coefﬁcients
b3,5 and b3,6 are (are not) signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level where the correspond-
ing b2,5 and b2,6 coefﬁcients are (are not) signiﬁcantly different from zero. The coefﬁcient b3,8
(b3,9) reﬂects the excess of the coefﬁcient for LLEit (LLEi,t21) under IAS 39 for accounting
years ended in the second half of 2008 over the corresponding coefﬁcient for previous years
under IAS 39. b3,8 . 0 and b3,9 , 0( b3,8 , 0 and b3,9 . 0) would indicate that loan-loss pro-
visioning was less timely (more timely) immediately prior to accounting years ended in the
second half of 2008 than it had been previously under IAS 39. There is no consistent pattern
with respect to the signs of the coefﬁcients b3,8 and b3,9 reported in Table 5. Four of the six
b3,8 coefﬁcients are negative and two are positive, four of the six b3,9 coefﬁcients are positive
and two are negative, and none of the b3,8 and b3,9 coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different from
zero at the 5% level. On the basis of this, there is no evidence that provisioning was less
timely in respect of loans written-off in accounting years ended in the second half of 2008,
when the effects of the ﬁnancial and banking crisis became particularly severe, than previously.
As indicated previously, the use of the relationship in time between write-offs and loan-loss
expense to compare the timeliness of the loan-loss expenses in different intervals relies on the
assumption that write-offs themselves are equally timely across the different intervals. In order
to mitigate to some extent the effect of possible management of the timing of write-offs, the
write-offs used in this analysis are stated net of next-year recoveries. Nevertheless, I also
carried out an additional test to provide evidence as to whether results reported in Table 5 that
suggest greater timeliness of loan-loss provisioning by UK banks under IAS 39 than previously
may be due to write-offs under IAS 39 being less timely than previously. I estimate additional
regression models with the same structure as model (2), with and without control variables,
except that the loan-loss expense is replaced by the change in non-performing loans and the
latter item no longer appears as a control variable. These models provide evidence as to
whether there is a difference between the pre-IAS 39 interval and the post-IAS 39 interval in
the timeliness of write-offs with respect to changes in the quality of the loan portfolio. If the
signs of the coefﬁcients b2,5 (negative) and b2,6 (positive) reported in Table 5 are primarily
attributable to such a difference, the same pattern of coefﬁcients would be observed in these
additional regression models. I estimate these regression models for all banks and separately
for quoted banks and for unquoted banks. In none of the six cases (all banks, quoted banks
and unquoted banks; with and without control variables) does this give rise to the pattern of coef-
ﬁcients reported in Table 5. Therefore, it does not appear that the pattern of b2,5 and b2,6 coefﬁ-
cients reported in Table 5 is due to reduced timeliness of write-offs with respect to changes in the
quality of the loan portfolio.
The results reported in this subsection are consistent with a US result reported by Beck and
Narayanamoorthy (2012), referred to in Section 2.3, which suggests that the more restrictive evi-
dence requirement introduced in the US in 2001 by SAB 102 improved the association between
loan write-offs and past loan-loss allowances for some banks.
5.2 Did general provisioning enhance the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning before IAS
39?
Table 6 reports the results from estimation of regression models (1) and (4), both without control
variables and with control variables, for the interval before IAS 39 was implemented in the UK.
From regression model (1), all coefﬁcients for the current-year loan-loss expense (b1,2) and the








































































 Table 6. Tests of timeliness of general-provision element of loan-loss expense before IAS 39.
Model (1) Model (4)
Without controls With controls Without controls With controls
Panel A: All banks in the data set (34 banks; 143 cases)
Intercept (bn,1) 0.0016 (0.089) 20.0034 (0.269) 0.0015 (0.117) 20.0037 (0.269)
LLEit (bn,2) 0.3253 (0.056) 0.3107 (0.043) 0.3087 (0.050) 0.2939 (0.029)
LLEi,t21 (bn,3) 0.3769 (0.066) 0.4239 (0.028) 0.4321 (0.021) 0.4581 (0.007)
LLEGENi,t21 (b4,4) 20.9457 (0.121) 20.3984 (0.499)
CHNPLit (bn,10) 20.0003 (0.740) 20.0003 (0.767)
EARNit (bn,11) 0.2274 (0.022) 0.2269 (0.020)
EQASSi,t21 (bn,12) 0.0058 (0.612) 0.0090 (0.444)
Adjusted R
2 51.1% 74.7% 52.5% 74.7%
Panel B: Banks with a stock market quotation (10 banks; 49 cases)
Intercept (bn,1) 20.0010 (0.014) 0.0025 (0.164) 20.0009 (0.020) 0.0022 (0.125)
LLEit (bn,2) 0.8278 (,0.001) 0.9074 (,0.001) 0.7712 (0.001) 0.9168 (,0.001)
LLEi,t21 (bn,3) 0.2966 (0.061) 0.1214 (0.016) 0.3473 (0.068) 0.1057 (0.034)
LLEGENi,t21 (b4,4) 20.4361 (0.155) 0.0988 (0.479)
CHNPLit (bn,10) 20.0015 (0.107) 20.0016 (0.123)
EARNit (bn,11) 0.0573 (0.079) 0.0589 (0.058)
EQASSi,t21 (bn,12) 20.0643 (0.024) 20.0600 (0.019)
Adjusted R
2 86.4% 96.9% 86.5% 96.8%
Panel C: Banks without a stock market quotation (24 banks; 94 cases)
Intercept (bn,1) 0.0020 (0.118) 20.0040 (0.364) 0.0018 (0.155) 20.0042 (0.374)
LLEit (bn,2) 0.2952 (0.109) 0.2422 (0.129) 0.2872 (0.097) 0.2328 (0.103)
LLEi,t21 (bn,3) 0.3765 (0.097) 0.4569 (0.035) 0.4206 (0.041) 0.4810 (0.018)
LLEGENi,t21 (b4,4) 20.8204 (0.267) 20.3121 (0.679)
CHNPLit (bn,10) 20.0018 (0.359) 20.0017 (0.381)
EARNit (bn,11) 0.2696 (0.029) 0.2702 (0.027)
EQASSi,t21 (bn,12) 0.0033 (0.834) 0.0061 (0.715)
Adjusted R







































































































 Table 6. Continued.
Model (1) Model (4)
Without controls With controls Without controls With controls
Table 6. Continued.
Notes: Regression models (1) and (4) are estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series yearly data for UK banks from 2001 to 2008. The models are as follows:







d1,jYear Controljit + 11,it,
(1)







d4,jYear Controljit + 14,it,
(4)
where WOit is the loan write-off (gross of current-year recoveries and net of next-year recoveries) for bank i for year t, divided by the average of the opening and
closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; LLEit (LLEi,t21) is the loan-loss expense (gross of recoveries) for bank i for year t (t21), divided by
the averageof the opening and closing balance-sheet values ofloans ofbank i for year t21; LLEGENi,t21is the general-provision element of the loan-loss expense
(gross of recoveries) for bank i for year t21, divided by the average of opening and closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; CHNPLit is a
control variable equal to the proportionate change in a measure of the non-performing loans of bank i during year t; EARNit is a control variable equal to the proﬁt
onordinary activities of banki for yeart (before loan-loss expense) divided bythe averageof opening and closing loans ofbank i for yeart; EQASSi,t21 is acontrol
variable equal to the ratio of equity to total assets in the opening balance sheet of bank i for year t; Bank Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-
variable control for bank j, where b is the number of banks; Year Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for calendar year j; the b,
g and d terms are regression coefﬁcients; the 1 terms are error terms. Coefﬁcients for bank controls and calendar-year controls are not reported. p-Values are given



















































































 different from zero at the 5% level. The principal object of interest here is the estimate of coefﬁ-
cient b4,4 from model (4), which indicates whether the general-provision element of the loan-loss
expense was more timely than the speciﬁc-provision element. b4,4 . 0( b4,4 , 0) would indicate
that the general-provision element was more timely (less timely) than the speciﬁc-provision
element. In all but one case, the coefﬁcient is negative, and in no case is it signiﬁcantly different
from zero at the 5% level. Thus, there is no evidence that the general-provision element of loan-
loss expense enhanced the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning by UK banks before general pro-
visioning was eliminated by IAS 39.
5.3 Additional tests and robustness tests
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that, for the quoted subset of banks, loan-loss provisioning by
UK banks became more timely under IAS 39 than it had been before IAS 39. However, it is possible
that banks across the world, including those not directly affected by the implementation of IAS 39 in
the UK, may have been affected by events that coincided with the implementation of IAS 39 in the
UK, and that the effect documented in Table 5 is attributable to these events. In order to investigate
this possibility, model (2) is applied to US banks, which were not directly affected by the implemen-
tation of IAS 39. Here, the indicator variable DIit, which in the main tests denotes that a bank applied
IAS 39 in the previous year and which corresponds to the years 2006–2008, denotes the years
2006–2008. The following variables are collected from Compustat Bank for 601 banks and 3466
bank-years for which required data items are available during the interval 2001–2008: LNTAL
(loans – net of total allowances for loan losses), RCL (reserves for credit losses (assets)), PCL (pro-
vision – credit losses (income account)), NCO (net charge-offs) (termed write-offs in this paper),
LLRCR (loan loss recoveries – credited to reserves), NPAT (nonperforming assets – total), PI
(pretax income), AT (assets – total), CEQ (common/ordinary equity – total). Variables are con-
structed as follows, as for the UK data and with the same winsorisation. WOit is constructed from
NCO and LLRCR to give write-offs gross of current-year recoveries and net of next-year recoveries,
and LNTAL and RCL to give lagged gross loans by which this and other items are scaled; LLEit and
LLEi,t21 are constructed from PCL and LLRCR, to give the loan-loss expense gross of current-year
recoveries, which is scaled by lagged gross loans; the control variable CHNPLit is constructed from
NPATand grossloans;the control variable EARNitis constructed from PI, PCL and LLRCR, to give
earnings before loan-loss expense, which is scaled by gross loans; the control variable EQASSi,t21 is
constructed from CEQ and AT.
Table 7 reports in Panels A and B summary statistics for the US data. In Panel C, it reports the
results of applying model (2) to these US data. Recall that, for the UK data for which results are
reported in Table 5, the coefﬁcients b2,5 are all negative and the coefﬁcients b2,6 are all positive.
For the US data for which results are reported in Table 7, this pattern is not observed. b2,5 is posi-
tive both for the model without control variables and for the model with control variables, with
both coefﬁcients signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level; b2,6 is negative for the model
without control variables and positive for the model with control variables, with neither coefﬁ-
cient signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level. These results suggest that results reported
for UK banks that are consistent with loan-loss provisioning by UK banks becoming more timely
under IAS 39 are not driven by events that may have affected banks across the world rather than
just UK banks subject to IAS 39.
Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) (GN) report evidence that the loan-loss expense of
European banks was less asymmetrically timely with respect to the recognition of bad news
and good news after the implementation of IAS 39 than previously. GN’s results are not directly
comparable with those reported above in this paper. First, GN measure asymmetric timeliness in
the loan-loss expense with regard to its recognition of bad news and good news rather than its







































































 Table 7. Estimation of model (2) for US banks 2001–2008.
Panel A: Summary statistics – US banks
Bank-years Mean Median
Total assets (in billions of US dollars) 3466 14.03 1.04
Book equity/total assets (opening) 3466 8.91% 8.74%
Loans/total assets 3466 67.54% 69.02%
Loan-loss allowance/loans 3466 1.39% 1.29%
Loan-loss expense/proﬁt on ordinary activities
(absolute values)
3466 27.73% 14.32%
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression models – US banks
N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum
Write-off (as a percentage of lagged loans) 3466 0.33% 0.35% 0.00% 0.08% 0.21% 0.43% 1.31%
Loan-loss expense (as a percentage of lagged loans): 3466 0.52% 0.47% 0.01% 0.20% 0.37% 0.67% 1.85%
Change in non-performing loans 3466 13.65% 42.40% 240.00% 227.25% 4.70% 68.00% 68.00%
Proﬁt on ordinary activities (as a percentage of loans) 3466 2.65% 1.13% 0.70% 1.88% 2.56% 3.31% 5.13%
Equity as a percentage of total assets (opening) 3466 8.91% 1.88% 5.88% 7.52% 8.74% 10.04% 13.06%
Panel C: Results from estimation of model (2) for US banks (601 banks; 3466 cases)




















































































































Notes: In Panel A, the mean value for book equity/total assets (opening) is for the winsorised data used in the regression models, as also reported in Panel B. Proﬁt on ordinary activities is
stated before loan-loss expense. In Panel B, statistics are for the bank-year cases used in the analysis (after winsorisation). All are expressed as percentages. The items for which statistics
are provided are as follows: write-off (as a percentage of lagged loans) is the loan write-off (gross of current year recoveries and net of next-year recoveries) for bank i for year t as a
percentage of the average of the opening and closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; loan-loss expense (as a percentage of lagged loans) is the loan-loss expense
(gross of recoveries) for bank i for year t as a percentage of the average of the opening and closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21; change in non-performing loans is
the percentage change in a measure of the non-performing loans of bank i during year t; proﬁt on ordinary activities is the proﬁt on ordinary activities of bank i for year t (before loan-loss
expense) as a percentage of the average of opening and closing loans of bank i for year t; equity as a percentage of total assets (opening) is the equity as a percentage of total assets in the
opening balance sheet of bank i for year t. Regression model (2) is estimated, without control variables and with control variables, using pooled cross-section and time-series yearly data
for US banks from 2001 to 2008. The model is:







d2,jYear Controljit + 12,it,
(2)
where WOit is the loan write-off (gross of current-year recoveries and net of next-year recoveries) for bank i for year t, divided by the average of the opening and closing balance-sheet
values of loans of bank i for year t21; LLEit (LLEi,t21) is the loan-loss expense (gross of recoveries) for banki for year t (t21), divided by the average of the opening and closing balance-
sheet valuesof loans ofbank i for year t21; DIit is an indicator variableequal to one where the ﬁscal year is 2006, 2007or 2008, and zero otherwise; CHNPLit is a control variable equal to
the proportionate change in a measure of the non-performing loans of bank i during year t; EARNit is a control variable equal to the proﬁt on ordinary activities of bank i for year t (before
loan-loss expense) divided by the average of opening and closing loans of bank i for year t; EQASSi,t21 is a control variable equal to the ratio of equity to total assets in the opening
balance sheet of bank i for year t; Bank Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for bank j, where b is the number of banks; Year Controljit is the value for
bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for calendar year j; the b, g and d terms are regression coefﬁcients; the 1 terms are error terms. Coefﬁcients for bank controls and calendar-






































































































 overall timeliness by comparison with an event. Second, GN use data for 12 EU countries for
which differing pre-IAS 39 provisioning regimes may have been in place, whereas this paper
uses data for the UK only. Nevertheless, in light of the different inferences that might be
drawn based on this study and GN’s Europe-wide study, a regression model similar to that
used by GN is estimated for the UK data used in this paper. The model used by GN derives ulti-
mately from a model proposed by Basu (1997), which is motivated by the belief that greater time-
linessintherecognition of bad news thanof good newswill cause negative earnings changes tobe
less persistent than positive earnings changes. More directly, it derives from a development of the
Basu (1997) model by Nichols et al. (2009), which tests for asymmetric timeliness in the loan-loss
expense by testing for evidence of asymmetric persistence in earnings changes with respect to
income-decreasing changes and income-increasing changes in the loan-loss-expense component
of the earnings change.
15 For the UK data used in this paper, I estimate a regression model that is
similar to that used by GN. The number of cases used is 175, which is less than the number used in
the main tests due to the model’s use of lagged changes in earnings components. The model esti-
mated is as follows:
DEBTit = b5,1 + b5,2DEit + b5,3DEPLLEi,t−1 + b5,4DLLEi,t−1 + b5,5DEPLLEi,t−1 × DPit
+ b5,6DLLEi,t−1 × DLit + b5,7DIit + b5,8DEit × DIit + b5,9DEPLLEi,t−1 × DIit
+ b5,10DLLEi,t−1 × DIit + b5,11DEPLLEi,t−1 × DPit × DIit







d5,jYear Controljit + 15,it,
(5)
where DEBTit, DEPLLEi,t21 and DLLEi,t21 are, respectively, the change in earnings before taxfor
bank i for year t, the change in earnings before tax and loan-loss expense for bank i for year t21
and the change in loan-loss expense for bank i for year t21 times 21, where each item is scaled
by the average of the opening and closing balance-sheet values of loans of bank i for year t21a s
for the principal variables in the main tests in this paper; DEit is an indicator variable equal to one
where the change in earnings before tax for bank i for year t21 is negative, and zero otherwise;
DPit is an indicator variable equal to one where DEPLLEi,t21 is negative, and zero otherwise; DLit
is an indicator variable equal to one where DLLEi,t21 is negative (income decreasing), and zero
otherwise; DIit is an indicator variable equal to one where bank i applied IAS 39 for year t21, and
zero otherwise; CHNPLit is a control variable equal to the proportionate change in a measure of
the non-performing loans of bank i during year t; EQASSi,t21 is a control variable equal to the
ratio of equity to total assets in the opening balance sheet of bank i for year t; Bank Controljit
is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for bank j, where b is the
number of banks; Year Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable
control for calendar year j (now for 2003–2005 because of the reduced data set); the b, g and
d terms are regression coefﬁcients; the 1 term is an error term. The control variable in respect
of earnings included in models (1) to (4) is not included here, since earnings change is the depen-
dent variable. Following the reasoning outlined above with respect to the Basu (1997) asym-
metric-persistence model, a negative (positive) value for the coefﬁcient b5,12 would indicate
that the loan-loss expense was more (less) asymmetrically timely after the implementation of
IAS 39 than before.
16 The results from estimation of model (5), with and without control vari-








































































 is negative and not signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level.
17 This contrasts with the cor-
responding coefﬁcient in GN (coefﬁcient b11 in GN’s Table 9), which was positive and signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero and therefore indicative that loan-loss expense was less
asymmetrically timely under IAS 39 than before IAS 39 for Europe as a whole. The application
of the asymmetric-persistence-based test of asymmetric timeliness to the data used in this paper
does not suggest that the UK loan-loss expense is more asymmetrically timely under IAS 39 than
before IAS 39. One possible source of difference between the Europe-wide asymmetric-timeli-
ness result reported by GN and the UK result reported here is the adoption in some European
countries but not in the UK’s SORPB of the provisioning method allowed by the European Com-
munity’s Directive 86/635/EEC (see Section 2.2).
Table 8. Asymmetric-persistence-based test of asymmetric timeliness in the loan-loss expense (35 banks;
175 cases).
Without controls With controls
Intercept (b5,1) 0.0039 (0.024) 0.0093 (0.040)
DEit (b5,2) 20.0003 (0.924) 0.0001 (0.979)
DEPLLEi,t21 (b5,3) 20.1179 (0.701) 20.2691 (0.493)
DLLEi,t21 (b5,4) 20.8091 (0.310) 21.3453 (0.146)
DEPLLEi,t21 × DPit (b5,5) 0.1585 (0.710) 0.3862 (0.495)
DLLEi,t21 × DLit (b5,6) 0.9847 (0.260) 1.8625 (0.088)
DIit (b5,7) 20.0054 (0.066) 20.0024 (0.538)
DEit × DIt (b5,8) 20.0015 (0.755) 20.0008 (0.887)
DEPLLEi,t21 × DIit (b5,9) 20.2070 (0.677) 20.4348 (0.474)
DLLEi,t21 × DIit (b5,10) 1.2560 (0.274) 0.2457 (0.839)
DEPLLEi,t21 × DPit × DIit (b5,11) 0.0118 (0.989) 0.0888 (0.923)
DLLEi,t21 × DLit × DIt (b5,12) 22.1940 (0.127) 21.3150 (0.373)
CHNPLit (b5,13) 20.0058 (0.168)
EQASSi,t21 (b5,14) 20.0547 (0.079)
Adjusted R
2 1.5% 8.9%
Notes:Regressionmodel(5) isestimatedusingpooledcross-section andtime-seriesyearlydataforUK banksfrom2002to
2008. The model is as follows:
DEBTit = b5,1 + b5,2DEit + b5,3DEPLLEi,t−1 + b5,4DLLEi,t−1 + b5,5DEPLLEi,t−1 × DPit
+ b5,6DLLEi,t−1 × DLit + b5,7DIit + b5,8DEit × DIit + b5,9DEPLLEi,t−1 × DIit
+ b5,10DLLEi,t−1 × DIit + b5,11DEPLLEi,t−1 × DPit × DIit







d5,jYear Controljit + 15,it,
(5)
where DEBTit, DEPLLEi,t21 and DLLEi,t21 are, respectively, the change in earnings before tax for bank i for year t, the
change in earnings before tax and loan-loss expense for bank i for year t21 and the change in loan-loss expense for bank i
for year t21 times 21, where each item is scaled by the average of the opening and closing balance-sheet values of loans
of bank i for year t21; DEit is a indicator variable equal to one where the change in earnings before tax for bank i for year
t21 is negative, and zero otherwise; DPit is an indicator variable equal to one where DEPLLEi,t21 is negative, and zero
otherwise; DLit is an indicator variable equal to one where DLLEi,t21 is negative (income-decreasing), and zero otherwise;
DIit is an indicator variable equal to one where bank i applied IAS 39 for year t21, and zero otherwise; CHNPLitis a
control variable equal to the proportionate change in a measure of the non-performing loans of bank i during year t;
EQASSi,t21 is a control variable equal to the ratio of equity to total assets in the opening balance sheet of bank i for
year t; Bank Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for bank j, where b is the
number of banks; Year Controljit is the value for bank i for year t of an indicator-variable control for calendar year j;
the b, g and d terms are regression coefﬁcients; the 1 term is an error term. p-Values for a two-tailed test are given in
parentheses. p-Values are based on White standard errors that are robust to clustering by bank.







































































 Two robustness tests are carried out. First, it is recognised that the regression models for
which results are reported measure the association between write-offs at year t and loan-loss
expenses at year t and year t21 only, but that the distance in time between a loan-loss
expense and an associated write-off might exceed one year. A parsimonious way of including
in the analysis loan-loss expenses that precede associated write-offs by more than one year is
to replace the lagged loan-loss expense by the lagged end-of-year loan-loss allowance, which
reﬂects all previous loan-loss expenses less write-offs. Estimation of regression models (1)–(3)
with the lagged end-of-year loan-loss allowance in place of the lagged loan-loss expense gives
the same inferences as the results reported for regression models (1)–(3). Second, regression
model (4) is augmented by the general-provision element of the current-year loan-loss expense
and is estimated using a reduced data set for 2001–2004, when general provisioning was
always permitted in both the current year and the previous year. This gives the same inference
as the results reported for model (4) in Table 6.
5.4 Summary
The main results reported in this section do not suggest that loan-loss provisioning by UK banks
was less timely under the stricter evidence requirements of the IAS 39 incurred-loss regime than it
had been under the less-strict evidence requirements of the previous UK incurred-loss regime.
There is some evidence that loan-loss provisioning became more timely under IAS 39 than it
had been previously. However, the relevant coefﬁcients are only all statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% level for the subset of banks that had a UK stock market quotation for part of the interval
examined, for which the data set is relatively small. There is no evidence that UK provisioning
was less timely in the interval leading up to the ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s
than it had been previously under IAS 39. Also, there is no evidence that UK general provisioning
enhanced the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning in the interval before IAS 39 was implemented.
Results of an additional test using US data do not suggest that the pattern observed in the UK was
due to a general worldwide phenomenon. Also, results of an asymmetric-persistence-based test of
asymmetric timeliness do not suggest that, for the UK banks in the sample, loan-loss expense
became less asymmetrically timely under IAS 39 than it had been previously.
6. Conclusion
The ﬁnancial and banking crisis of the late 2000s gave rise to much accounting regulatory activity
regarding loan-loss provisioning. Much of this arose from the view that the incurred-loss method
of provisioning delayed the recognition of loan-loss expense. Attempts by regulators to replace
the incurred-loss methods required by US GAAP and IFRS encountered signiﬁcant difﬁculties.
One issue that arose related to the method by which the effective rate of interest on loans
should be calculated. Another related to the weight that an expected-loss provisioning method
should place on objective evidence of loss relative to evidence of a less speciﬁc and more judge-
mental nature.
This paper reports evidencerelevant to thelatter of these issues. It examines whether UK loan-
loss provisioning was less timely under the stricter evidence requirements of the IAS 39 incurred-
loss regime than it had been under the less strict evidence requirements of the previous UK
incurred-loss regime. In light of concern that the lack of timeliness of loan-loss provisioning
under IAS 39 may have been a particular problem immediately prior to the ﬁnancial and
banking crisis of the late 2000s, it also examines whether provisioning was less timely then
than it had been previously under IAS 39. Furthermore, it examines whether the pre-IAS 39








































































 provisioning by UK banks before the implementation of IAS 39. The evidence is based on data
from 2001 to 2008 for 37 UK banks, of which 12 had a UK stock market quotation at some time
during this interval and the remaining 25 were usually much smaller banks which, in many cases,
were UK subsidiaries of non-UK banks. Differences in timeliness are measured by reference to
the relationship in time between loan write-offs and loan-loss expense.
The results in this paper do not suggest that loan-loss provisioning by UK banks was less
timely under the IAS 39 incurred-loss regime than it had been under the previous UK
incurred-loss regime. In contrast, for the subset of quoted banks, the results indicate that it was
more timely under IAS 39 than before IAS 39. The results of the application of the main test
used in this paper to US banks, which were not directly affected by the implementation of IAS
39, do not suggest that these results were due to an economic event that affected banks all
over the world. The evidence does not indicate that loan-loss provisioning by UK banks was
less timely immediately prior to accounting years ended in the second half of 2008 than it had
been previously under IAS 39. Furthermore, for the interval before the implementation of IAS
39 when general provisioning was permitted in the UK, there is no evidence that general provi-
sioning enhanced the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning. The results reported in this paper do
not suggest that stricter requirements regarding the evidence necessary to support recognition
of loan losses have resulted in less timely loan-loss provisioning.
The results in this paper are subject to some caveats. The data set is relatively small. This is
particularly so for the subset of quoted banks for which there is evidence that loan-loss provision-
ing by UK banks was more timely under IAS 39 than previously. Also, it is possible that effects
observed may be due in part to changes in the banking regulatory environment during the interval
analysed in this paper. Furthermore, it should be emphasised that this paper compares the time-
liness of loan-loss provisioning under the IAS 39 incurred-loss regime and under the pre-IAS 39
UK incurred-loss regime, and does not consider the timeliness of any particular proposed
expected-loss method. Finally, as is evidenced by recent regulatory debate, it is important to
emphasise that there are criteria other than timeliness by which the quality of loan-loss provision-
ing might be judged.
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Notes
1. In this paper, the term ‘provisioning’ denotes the overall process of recognising loan-loss expense.
2. See http://www.ifrs.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/IASB+Work+Plan.htm for comment letters
in respect of Exposure draft ED/2009/12: ﬁnancial instruments – amortised cost and impairment
(IASB 2009).
3. See http://www.fasb.org (comment letter reference 1810–100) for comment letters in respect of Pro-
posed accounting standards update: accounting for ﬁnancial instruments and revisions to the account-
ing for derivative instruments and hedging activities (FASB 2010).
4. See http://www.fasb.org (comment letter reference 2011–150) for comment letters in respect of Sup-
plement to Exposure draft ED/2009/12: ﬁnancial instruments – amortised cost and impairment (IASB
2011a) and Supplementary document – ﬁnancial instruments: impairment. For a summary of the prin-
cipal issues raised, see IASB (2011b).
5. See also Laux (2012) and Ryan (2012) for informative reviews that refer to loan-loss provisioning
within the context of recent events. Laux (2012) includes a comparison of properties and possible
effects of an expected-loss provisioning method and those of an incurred-loss method. Ryan (2012)







































































 discusses the potential contribution of extended disclosure of components of the loan-loss expense as a
means of enhancing the quality of risk reporting.
6. IAS 39 did not require separate disclosure of the individual and collective components of the loan-loss
allowance, but some UK banks disclosed these components. Comparison of loan-loss allowance
accounts in the ﬁnal year of the SORPB regime and the ﬁrst year of the IAS 39 regime indicates
that the ‘collective’ category of some banks’ loan loss allowances under IAS 39 included a substantial
element that had been categorised as ‘speciﬁc’ under the SORPB regime. For example, for HSBC
Holdings plc, the speciﬁc and general components of the loan-loss allowance in the ﬁnal pre-IAS
39 balance sheet on 31 December 2004 were $10,117 million and $2569 million, respectively, and
the individual and collective components of the brought-forward balance reported in the 2005 ﬁnancial
statements were $3728 million and $8906 million, respectively. Similar patterns were observed in
other banks for which disclosures were made.
7. For example, the directive was not adopted in the UK but, as can be seen from Poveda (2000, p. 11), it
inﬂuenced aspects of the loan-loss-provisioning regime in Spain. As mentioned above, the difference
between the pre-IAS 39 loan-loss provisioning regimes in the UK and in Spain was sufﬁciently sig-
niﬁcant to give rise to comment as part of the evidence to the House of Lords enquiry (House of
Lords 2011b, p. 108).
8. The issue of SAB 102 coincided with a policy statement from the Federal Financial Institutions Exam-
ination Council (2001).
9. See Vyas (2011) for another event-based approach to the examination of the timeliness of loan-loss
provisioning. Vyas (2011) examines the timeliness of provisioning through comparison of loan-loss
expense with changes in credit-quality indices.
10. All accounting periods used in this paper are years or minor variants thereof. Accounting periods are
therefore referred to as ‘years’ or ‘accounting years’.
11. As the previous change in non-performing loans is also a candidate for inclusion as a control variable,
this is used instead of the current-period change in non-performing loans in tests for which results are
not reported. The results from the use of the lagged change in non-performing loans are very similar to
the results that are reported.
12. The current-year general-provision element is not included here as general provisioning did not occur
in the UK for the last year of this 2001–2005 data set. In a robustness test, a regression model that
includes an additional current-year general-provision term is estimated using a shorter data set for
2001–2004 for which current-year general-provision data are available for all cases. The inference
from this model is the same as that given by the model for which results are reported.
13. Some of the banks included in the former category did not have a UK stock-market quotation for all
years used in the analysis. Abbey National plc became part of Grupo Santander in late 2004; Alliance
and Leicester plc became part of Grupo Santander in late 2008; Bradford and Bingley plc was natio-
nalised in late 2008, with part of the business being transferred to Grupo Santander; Northern Rock plc
was nationalised in early 2008. All of these banks were assigned to the quoted group throughout the
analysis. Data from their ﬁnancial statements for the entire interval covered by the analysis, including
for that part of the interval after they ceased to be quoted, were used.
14. The disclosure of recoveries, required by SORPB and continued by UK banks under IAS 39, is typi-
cally in a more compact form than in Figure 1. Typically only one of the two recovery-related move-
ments is shown explicitly, either as an addition or a subtraction within the allowance account.
15. As has been observedby Ryan (2006,p. 519), theinterpretation of asymmetric-persistence measures as
measures of asymmetric timeliness is subject to some limitation in that asymmetric-persistence
measures are strictly measures of asymmetry in the degree to which bad news and good news are
recognised in a ‘chunky’ fashion rather than measures of asymmetric timeliness.
16. A negative value for the coefﬁcient would imply that any tendency for income-decreasing changes in
the loan-loss expense to give rise to lower persistence in earnings changes was more pronounced under
IAS 39 than previously. Following the reasoning outlined above with respect to the Basu (1997) asym-
metric-persistence model, this would be interpreted as evidence of greater asymmetric timeliness in the
loan-loss expense under IAS 39 than previously
17. A slightly adapted version of regression model (5) is also estimated for the subsets of quoted and
unquoted banks. Due to the lack of income-increasing changes in loan-loss expense under IAS 39
for the quoted banks in the data set, the models for the subsets are estimated where DLit is equal to
one where DLLEi,t21 is below its mean, and zero otherwise. Using this criterion for the quoted and
unquoted subsets and for the sample as a whole, the coefﬁcient b5,12 is negative and not signiﬁcantly
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